Within Shutdown
Why 'Actionable Intelligence' Became the Deciding Test
The programme ended because its reports did not give intelligence officers reliable information they could act on before answers were known.
On this page
- What actionable intelligence meant in practice
- Why vague impressions could not guide operations
- How the finding justified closure
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Introduction
The decisive question that ended the U.S. government’s remote-viewing programme was not whether a few sessions appeared impressive in retrospect. It was whether the programme produced intelligence that decision-makers could trust before the answer was already known. For an intelligence service, information has value only if it can influence real operations by reducing uncertainty, directing resources, or warning of threats. By that standard, the 1995 independent review commissioned by the CIA concluded that remote viewing had failed. Although the reviewers acknowledged that some laboratory findings deserved scientific discussion, they found no documented case in which remote-viewing reports had provided actionable intelligence that guided operational decisions. That distinction—not the broader debate over paranormal claims—became the practical reason the programme was closed.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
What actionable intelligence meant in practice
Within the intelligence community, “actionable intelligence” is information that can support a specific operational or policy decision. It must be timely, sufficiently accurate, and specific enough for commanders or analysts to act with reasonable confidence.
In practical terms, remote-viewing reports would have needed to answer questions such as:
- Where is a particular target located?
- What activity is occurring at a specific facility?
- When is an event likely to happen?
- Which lead deserves immediate investigation?
An intelligence report does not become actionable merely because parts of it later resemble reality. It must be reliable before verification is available. Intelligence officers routinely commit aircraft, satellites, investigators, or diplomatic resources based on reports. Acting on incorrect information can waste resources, expose sources, or endanger lives. Consequently, any collection method is judged by whether it consistently improves decisions rather than by occasional dramatic successes.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
This operational definition explains why the final review focused far more on usability than on debates over statistical anomalies observed under laboratory conditions.
Why vague impressions could not guide operations
The American Institutes for Research (AIR) evaluation found that remote-viewing reports generally failed where intelligence collection has to succeed: translating observations into dependable operational knowledge.
Several recurring problems limited their usefulness.
Lack of specificity. Reports often consisted of impressions, colours, shapes, emotions or symbolic imagery instead of precise, verifiable facts. Such descriptions rarely identified an exact location, individual or activity with sufficient confidence for operational planning.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
High signal mixed with high noise. Even when portions of a session appeared accurate, they were embedded within large amounts of incorrect, irrelevant or ambiguous material. Analysts therefore had no objective way to distinguish genuine information from error before independent confirmation became available.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
Interpretation depended heavily on hindsight. Many reported “hits” became convincing only after investigators already knew the correct answer. Once an outcome is known, broad or symbolic statements can often be matched to events more easily than they could have predicted them in advance. Intelligence work, however, requires prospective rather than retrospective accuracy.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
Limited reproducibility across viewers. Independent viewers frequently produced different descriptions of the same target, making it difficult for analysts to determine which, if any, deserved confidence. A collection system that cannot generate consistent reporting cannot easily be integrated with other intelligence sources.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
These shortcomings meant that remote-viewing reports generally increased analytical uncertainty rather than reducing it. Instead of providing a clear lead, they often required analysts to spend additional effort separating potentially meaningful details from speculative material.
Why laboratory findings were not enough
One of the most important distinctions in the 1995 review was between scientific curiosity and operational capability.
The reviewers recognised that some experimental research reported statistical effects exceeding chance expectations. One reviewer, statistician Jessica Utts, argued that the laboratory evidence warranted further scientific investigation. However, the operational review reached a separate conclusion: even if an unusual phenomenon existed, it had not been demonstrated in a form that intelligence organisations could use reliably.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
This distinction mattered because intelligence agencies fund capabilities, not simply interesting scientific questions. A method must repeatedly produce information that improves real-world decisions under operational conditions. Laboratory significance alone does not establish that a technique can meet those demands.
The review therefore separated two questions:
- Is there evidence suggesting an anomalous effect worth further research?
- Does that effect produce dependable intelligence products?
The programme failed the second test, which was the one relevant to government funding and operational use.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
How the finding justified closure
The shutdown decision followed directly from this implementation problem rather than from a sweeping declaration about the paranormal.
The AIR evaluation stated that no documented instance showed remote-viewing information being used to guide intelligence operations and concluded that continued operational use was not warranted. The report specifically characterised the absence of actionable intelligence as the central reason for ending the programme.[CIA]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
For intelligence managers, this conclusion had practical consequences:
- The programme could not demonstrate measurable operational value.
- Analysts could not determine which reports were trustworthy before independent confirmation.
- Resources devoted to remote viewing could not be justified against competing collection methods with established performance.
From a management perspective, continuing to fund a collection system that could not reliably influence decisions conflicted with the basic standards applied to other intelligence capabilities.
Why the decision remains widely misunderstood
Public discussion often reduces the programme’s closure to a simple claim that the government either “proved psychic powers false” or “suppressed successful results.” The documentary record supports neither interpretation.
Instead, the official decision addressed a narrower institutional question: whether remote viewing had demonstrated sufficient reliability as an intelligence collection tool. The reviewers concluded that it had not. Their judgement rested on operational performance, not on resolving every scientific or philosophical question about anomalous cognition.[CIA+2PMC]cia.govAN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th…
Understanding this distinction explains why “actionable intelligence” became the decisive phrase in the programme’s history. Intelligence organisations exist to produce information that supports real decisions under uncertainty. Once reviewers concluded that remote-viewing reports could not consistently meet that standard, the rationale for maintaining the programme largely disappeared.
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The Men Who Stare At Goats
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The Demon-Haunted World
Explains evidential standards and why extraordinary operational claims require robust proof.
Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies
First published 1997. Subjects: United states, department of defense, United states, central intelligence agency, Parapsychology.
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First published 1996. Subjects: Biography, Military aspects, Military aspects of Parapsychology, Parapsychology, Psychics.
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Endnotes
1.
Source: cia.gov
Link:https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5.pdf
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AN EVALUATION OF THE REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAMIn no case had the information provided ever been used to guide intelligence operations. Th...
2.
Source: history.com
Title: cia esp espionage soviet union [cold war]({{ ‘cold-war/’ | relative_url }})
Link:https://www.history.com/articles/cia-esp-espionage-soviet-union-cold-war
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The CIA Recruited 'Mind Readers' to Spy on the Soviets in...17 Oct 2018 — The report also declared Star Gate as a failure, arguing that...
3.
Source: pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Title: PMCFollow‐up on the U.S
Link:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10275521/
Source snippet
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA...by Á Escolà‐Gascón · 2023 · Cited by 10 — Since 1972, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) co...
4.
Source: cia.gov
Link:https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200180005-5
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not warranted.... intelligence community were reviewed by AIR...Read more...
5.
Source: Wikipedia
Title: Remote viewing
Link:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remote_viewing
Source snippet
Remote viewingThe program ran from 1975 to 1995 and ended after evaluators concluded that remote viewers consistently failed to produc...
Additional References
6.
Source: skepsis.nl
Link:https://skepsis.nl/[stargate
Source snippet
CIA onderzoekt ESP / remote viewingStargate onder het mes. Twintig jaar geheim militair onderzoek naar remote viewing. door Ray Hyman – S...
7.
Source: reddit.com
Title: the cias stargate project was never about remote
Link:https://www.reddit.com/r/AlternativeHistory/comments/1mjynec/the_cias_stargate_project_was_never_about_remote/
Source snippet
The CIA's Stargate Project Was Never About Remote...It was officially terminated in 1995 when the CIA determined it wasn't useful in any...
8.
Source: scribd.com
Title: CIA RDP96 00791R000200180006 4 1 pdf
Link:https://www.scribd.com/document/395167398/CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180006-4-1-pdf
Source snippet
Cia RDP96 00791R000200180006 4 PDFThus, we conclude that continued use of remote viewing in intelligence gathering operations is not warr...
9.
Source: greydynamics.com
Link:https://greydynamics.com/intelligence-past-the-tangible-world-cias-stargate-project/
Source snippet
Intelligence Past the Tangible World: CIA's Stargate Project“REMOTE VIEWING IS A HIGHLY CONTROLLED AND FORMALLY ESTABLISHED, UNIQUE INTEL...
10.
Source: Wikipedia
Title: Stargate Project (U.S. Army unit)
Link:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stargate_Project_%28U.S._Army_unit%29
Source snippet
Stargate Project (U.S. Army unit)According to the AIR review, no remote viewing report ever provided actionable information for any in...
11.
Source: youtube.com
Title: Joe Mc Moneagle
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRTon6qgVws
Source snippet
Project stargate cia report 1995 actionable intelligence Project Stargate: The CIA’s Secret Psychic Program — Declassified Evidence The U...
12.
Source: ftp.nuneslaw.com
Title: Page 12. © ftp.nuneslaw.com.Read more
Link:https://ftp.nuneslaw.com/default.aspx/fulldisplay/243/219/u2D907/project-stargate-and-remote-viewing-technology-th.pdf
Source snippet
Stargate And Remote Viewing Technology Th25 Mar 2026 — - Overall, the report concluded that remote viewing offered no reliable intelligen...
13.
Source: youtube.com
Title: Project Stargate’s Strangest Findings Before It Was Shut Down | ARCHIVE FILE 004
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bMJkOENDew
Source snippet
The Stargate Project: When the CIA Dabbled with the Psychic...
14.
Source: researchgate.net
Link:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/403178755_The_Star_Gate_Archives_Reports_of_the_United_States_Government_Sponsored_Psi_Program_1972-1995_Volume_4_Operational_Remote_Viewing_Memorandums_and_Reports
Source snippet
(PDF) The Star Gate Archives: Reports of the United States...18 Jun 2026 — The second component was a review of the operational applicat...
15.
Source: youtube.com
Title: Uncovering the CIA’s Secret Weapon: Psychic Spies
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNJwV3Ksxa8
Source snippet
Project Stargate's Strangest Findings Before It Was Shut Down | ARCHIVE FILE 004...
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